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Abstract—Since the variability of data within readings from
the same person is intrinsic property of every biometric sys-
tem, the problem of finding a good representative – the tem-
plate – was recognized and present since the beginning of
biometrics. This problem was solved differently for different
biometric types, yet usually the template somehow averages
the collected data samples. However, for the iris type, the
template is usually just one or a few samples. In this paper
we describe the experiments that suggest that the averaging is
also justified in case of iris template creation. This is an im-
portant fact, which can significantly improve a performance
of biometric template protection methods for iris.
Keywords—binary iris codes, biometric template selection, iris
biometrics.
1. Introduction
The biometric recognition is based on comparison of the
stored representative (the template) for the person in ques-
tion with the newly acquired biometric sample. The re-
sulting score of such a comparison reﬂects the similarity
(dissimilarity) of the sample to the template. Based on a set
threshold the system decides whether this score allows to
state that they both originate from the same person or not.
Thus it is desirable that the similarity (dissimilarity) be-
tween the selected representative and other samples from
the same person is above (in case of dissimilarity below)
this threshold. This requirement was suﬃcient for a stan-
dard biometric system to be eﬀective.
By standard biometric system we mean a biometric sys-
tem, where the decision is made upon the direct compar-
ison of the template with the newly acquired sample. In
contrast to the standard biometric system are the biomet-
ric systems that incorporate technique called the biometric
template protection ([1], [2]). In those, the comparison is
done not based on the similarity (dissimilarity) of the tem-
plate and the sample but is an exact match between what
is called pseudonymous identifiers generated from the tem-
plate and the sample.
The pseudonymous identiﬁer is a bit string that can be re-
peatable and with no errors generated from biometric data,
possibly with some additional information. It is usually
obtained with the help of an error correction mechanism,
which might be a quantization scheme, an error-correction
code or a secret sharing algorithm. For those algorithms
to be eﬃcient (to enlarge the length of the pseudonymous
identiﬁer and thus strengthen the security) it is desirable
that they need to correct as few errors as possible. This
yields for a template that not only will guarantee that the
similarity (dissimilarity) will be above (below) some thresh-
old, but also that the similarity (dissimilarity) between tem-
plate and the samples will be as high (as low) as possible.
Thus the problem of selecting the best representative as the
template is restated.
2. Previous Work
The importance of selecting the best template is often un-
derestimated. It happens that the template is simply any
acquired biometric sample with no systematic procedure of
its selection. In some cases there is a procedure that selects
a sample that is the most similar to other samples of the
same person. There are also cases where the template is
created as a mean feature vector of collected samples for
one person. This is well motivated by the Condorcet rule
which states that an estimator (here the template) averaged
over many estimators (here each code may be interpreted as
an estimator of the ideal code) has smaller variance, thus
is better. The question remains how to average. In this
section we discuss some known approaches for template
selection in diﬀerent biometric.
2.1. Hand
The hand geometry biometrics uses the features that are
very easy to interpret. Those features are the lengths and
the widths of the ﬁngers, the widths and the heights of the
palm and other geometric features, that are gathered in one
ﬁxed-length feature vector F = [ f1, f2, ..., fn] that takes the
values from Rn. As a natural measure of dissimilarity of-
ten the Euclidean distance between such a vectors is used.
It is a common practice in such a systems that the tem-
plate is selected as the centroid (the mean vector) of a few
samples ([3], [4]). However one must realize an important
(though quite simple) fact. If we want to select the point
that best represents our set in the sense that it is the clos-
est to all the samples (it minimizes the sum of Euclidean
distances between itself and other samples) than it is not
the mean vector. The mean vector minimizes the squared
Euclidean distance and it is not equivalent.
To prove this we have made an experiment with hand ge-
ometry system proposed in [4]. We have used the data set
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of 149 users with at least 4 hand images each (3 of them
were used to create the template and the rest for compar-
isons). For every user two templates were created – the ﬁrst
one as the mean vector of 3 sample and the second as on of
the 3 samples that was closest to other two. For those two
templates we calculated genuine and impostor scores (re-
sulting in 179 genuine scores and 45105 impostor ones) us-
ing two dissimilarity measures – Euclidean distance (Euc)
and squared Euclidean distance (Euc2). The results are
compared on the basis of the equal error rate (EER)
(Table 1) – this maybe a bit simplifying, though it shows
an important fact. The method of template selection should
be adjusted to dissimilarity/similarity measure, in particular
a mean vector is not an appropriate template when using
Euclidean distance. For Euclidean distance the best tem-
plate out of 3 gives better results and for squared Euclidean
distance the mean code performs better.
Table 1
EER results for diﬀerent conﬁgurations of template
and dissimilarity measure
EER Euc Euc2
Best [%] 7.48 7.81
Mean [%] 7.56 7.24
2.2. Fingerprint
There was much research put into the feature extraction
and matching algorithms for ﬁngerprint minutiae but re-
spectively little attention (as in other biometric modali-
ties) was given to the problem of template selection. There
were some analysis of diﬀerent selection of representative
ﬁngerprint impression that either best represents the intra-
class variations or maximizes the similarity with the rest of
the impressions [5]. The results showed that a systematic
template selection is much better than random selection.
Further work on template creation for ﬁngerprint showed
that it is reasonable not to choose a single impression but
Fig. 1. Fingerprint features mosaicing, (a) two impressions,
(b) minutiae extracted from impressions, (c) alignment, (d) mo-
saicked template [6].
merge few impressions (mosaicing) of the same ﬁngerprint
resulting in bigger coverage of the ﬁnger thus better repre-
sentation.
In [6] Ross et al. analyzed three diﬀerent techniques of
data merging. The ﬁrs was mosaicing on the image level.
They aligned the images and merged them using thin plate
splines, and then extracted minutiae and performed match-
ing using those minutiae as template. The second approach
was to ﬁrst extract the minutia form two impressions and
do the mosaicing on the minutiae level and use the merged
minutiae as the template (Fig. 1). The third method was
to separately use both impressions (matching two minu-
tiae representations) and fusing the matching scores. The
experiments showed that the second method (mosaicing on
minutiae level) gives the best results and outperforms single
impression matching.
These results are especially important for biometric cryp-
tography (template protection) methods. Most of them
that use the ﬁngerprint use the fuzzy vault algorithm
(see, e.g., [7]) where a good coverage of ﬁngerprint is
one of the most important aspects. This was showed by
Nandakumar in his implementation of fuzzy vault for ﬁn-
gerprints ([8]). The usage of mosaiced template improved
the results for genuine acceptance by as much as 4% not
decreasing the security (false acceptance).
2.3. Signature
Some recent ﬁndings in the area of handwritten signatures
based on the theory of warped least squares, prove that an
template called the hidden signature can be deﬁned that
greatly improves the performance of matching. This hid-
den signature can be interpreted as a mean template, but
the averaging is done in warped space – for any signature
a transform (a warping path) is deﬁned that map it to the
space of the warped template were the comparison is done.
See [9] for details.
2.4. Iris
As for the iris biometrics, there is no common methodology
for template selection. In most cases the template is simply
an iris code of acquired image ([10], [11]), or a set of
iris codes ([12]). Sometimes like in BiomIris ([13]) the
template is chosen as one out of three codes, such that it
minimizes the sum of distances to two others. There were
also suggestions that average code created as the majority
code could be a better representation [14] however that has
been argued to have limited use in practice ([15]).
We have to also keep in mind that there are diﬀerent coding
methods for iris recognition that end up with binary code.
The question is whether the selection method the best rep-
resentative would be the same for diﬀerent algorithms or
rather it is algorithm-speciﬁc. To address this we propose
a few diﬀerent candidates for the template and verify their
eﬀectiveness for two diﬀerent coding algorithms, namely
the OSIRIS implementation of Daugman coding [10] and
Czajka’s algorithm [16]. OSIRIS is an implementation of
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Daugman-like iris texture coding. In our particular realiza-
tion it produces an binary iris code of length 1974 bits.
The Czajka’s algorithm represents a diﬀerent approach
to texture coding using Zak-Gabor transform. It produces
a binary iris code of length 1024 bits.
3. Selection Methods
3.1. Notation
Let us deﬁne the following notation that will be valid here-
after:
• I = {0,1}N – space of binary codes of length N (ver-
tices of a unit hyper-cube),
• A⊂ I,A = a1,a2, . . . ,aK – set of K available iris codes
for particular person, a – iris code,
• ai j – jth bit of ith code for the same person, i =
1, . . . ,K, j = 1, . . . ,N.
For simplicity, to omit unresolved cases let us assume that
the K is odd.
3.2. Possible Candidates
Now we can deﬁne diﬀerent candidates for the iris template.
Let us deﬁne the average code as
a¯ =
(
1
K
K
∑
i=1
ai
)
, a¯ ∈ RN ,
where ai is an N-dimensional iris code i = 1 . . .K.
We can write also,
a¯ = arga′∈RN min ∑
a∈A
∥∥a−a′∥∥2 .
This follows from the fact, that the second moment is min-
imal around the mean value, thus we interpret the code
a¯ as the real code that minimizes the squared Euclidean
distances from all codes from set A – best represents them.
Let us also deﬁne the majority code as
aMI =
(
Maj
( K
∑
i=2
ai j −
N
2
)
, j = 1, . . . ,N
)
, aMI ∈ I .
This is the code that has jth bit equal to 1 if among K
codes there were more 1’s than 0’s on this position and 0
otherwise. Since we assumed K to be odd we excluded the
case in which the number of 1’s and 0’s is equal.
The relation between the code a¯ and aMI is summarized by
the following theorem.
Theorem 1: The majority code aMI is the nearest code from
the subspace I to the average code a¯.
Proof : The relation between the mean and the median is
as follows:
|m−me| = |E(X −me)| ≤ E(|X −me|) , (1)
≤ E(|X −m|) , (2)
= E(
√
(X −m)2) ,
≤
√
E((X −m)2) , (3)
= σ .
The Eq. (1) inequality comes from the property of sum
of absolute values, the Eq. (2) inequality comes from the
fact that the median value minimizes the absolute devi-
ation function. The Eq. (3) inequality comes from the
Jensen’s inequality, for the concave functions (square root
function).
Thus the mean m value is less than σ from the median me.
|m−me| < σ
what proves the theorem.

Yet we know that under taken assumptions (K is odd) we
have σ < 0.5 and m∈< 0,1 >−{0.5}. That means that the
median code is the closest binary code (∈ I) to the average
code.
aMI = arga′∈I min
∥∥a′− a¯∥∥2
At the same time, from the properties of median, we have
aMI = arga′∈I min ∑
a∈A
∣∣a−a′∣∣ .
Since |.| and ‖.‖2 are equal for the subspace I, we see that
the aMI is an analog of the average code but with constraints
to the solution space.
aMI = arga′∈I min ∑
a∈A
∥∥a−a′∥∥2
We can also point out two additional codes from the set A.
The code that is closest to the average code and the code
that is closest to majority code. Those are deﬁned as re-
spectively
a¯A = arga′∈A min
∥∥a′− a¯∥∥2 or (a¯A = arga′∈A min |a′− a¯|),
aMA = arga′∈A min
∥∥a′−aMI ∥∥2 .
There is also a code often used as the template that is
deﬁned as
aTA = arga′∈A min ∑
a∈A
∥∥a−a′∥∥2
and is the analog of the majority binary code but selected
from the set A (set of known sample codes). This is the
code previously called the best code.
Intuitively the best representation, contrary to [15], would
be the majority code.
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4. Experiments
According to above discussion we performed a series of
experiments to verify the usability of diﬀerent template se-
lection. In the following experiments we have used part of
BATH database (110 eyes with 20 images per eye). For
each experiment always the ﬁrst 10 images were used to
create the template and the rest 10 were used as samples
for comparisons. The genuine comparisons were performed
with the template against 10 genuine samples what makes
1100 = 110 ·10 comparison in total, and impostors with the
template against 10 samples of all other eyes what makes
119900 = 110 · (110− 1) · 10. The experiments were per-
formed for two coding methods - OSIRIS and Czajka’s cod-
ing. To describe the results we calculated several param-
eters including false non-match rate (FNMR), false match
rate (FMR) and, as suggested in [17], decidability index d′.
The FNMR was calculated as the rate of positive samples
wrongly classiﬁed as negative ones, FMR as the rate of
negative samples wrongly classiﬁed as positive ones and
EER as the rate where FNMR and FMR are equal.
4.1. OSIRIS Coding
First we wanted to compare the performance of the recog-
nition algorithms depending on the way the template is
created. In particular we compared the performance us-
ing the majority code deﬁned as aMI the best iris code de-
ﬁned as aTI and iris code that is the closest to the majority
code aMA . To compute the majority code we have aligned
normalized iris images (in polar format) using 2D correla-
tion, compute the codes for each image and took the median
value for each code bit (although the number of samples
was even none of the bits for all codes was 0.5). To select
the best code we have cross-matched all the 10 codes and
selected the one that had the minimal sum of distances to
the rest 9.
Next, for diﬀerent templates, we performed the veriﬁca-
tion according to the protocol deﬁned above. Figure 2 plots
the cumulative distributions (we do not plot the histograms
Fig. 2. Cumulative distributions of genuine and impostors scores
for diﬀerent templates (best code, random code, majority code
and code closest to majority) for OSIRIS coding algorithm.
for clarity) of genuine and impostor comparisons for diﬀer-
ent template selection method. We see that the diﬀerences
are signiﬁcant and the best results were obtained for ma-
jority code – Table 2 summarizes the results. With the
majority code we obtained the perfect separation and good
decidability index. Additionally there are plotted results
obtained when using as the template one of the 10 codes
selected at random labeled as random iris code.
Table 2
Summary of veriﬁcation performance for diﬀerent
template selection method for OSIRIS coding algorithm
Indexes
Best Majority
Closest to
Mean
code code
majority
code
code
EER [%] 0.0017 0 0.0017 0
FNMR
(FMR= 0%) [%]
0.27 0 0.18 0
d′ 7.82 8.84 7.62 9.06
To analyze the averaging property we decided to compare
those results with two more possibilities of average tem-
plate – namely a¯A (iris code closest to the real-value av-
erage) and ¯a′A (iris code closest to the real-value average
in L1-norm). The results are plotted in the Fig. 3. Still
the majority code outperforms the others, but surprisingly
the code a¯A is as bad as randomly selected code whereas
the code ¯a′A is as good as the best code a
T
A and closest
to majority code aMA . There is one more very interesting
property worth noticing. The methods that selected one
of the iris codes as the template did select diﬀerent codes
thus we cannot infer that some of presented methods are
equal. Intuitively we guess that, e.g., aMA should be the same
as aTA , but that is not the case.
Fig. 3. Genuine comparisons scores (normalized hamming dis-
tance) cumulative distributions for diﬀerent template selection
methods
The above described experiment with use of the OSIRIS as
the coding algorithm proved the assumption that creating
the template code by averaging leads to better performance.
The diﬀerence between the performance is signiﬁcant. It is
clear that the majority code gives the best results whereas
the results with the best code as the template are much
worse and with the random code are the worst. This proves
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the statement of Davida ([14], the averaging by majority
coding as the template creation has inﬂuence on the per-
formance and gives much better results.
Noting this fact we decided to go one step further and rep-
resent the template as a real-value vector Tpr = [p1..p1974]
in which each position pi represents the rate of this bit was
equal one in codes used to create the template. Thus it is
a vector with elements from < 0,1 > that could be inter-
preted as probabilities of 1 on that position in iris code of
particular person. This of course makes the template much
bigger since it is no longer represented as N bits, but N
real numbers, yet the size of it (precision) depends on the
number of samples used for template creation and could not
be very high. Nevertheless a more complicated problem is
the matching algorithm. We can no longer use the ExOR
operation and other method should be proposed.
A natural selection of a distance measure is the squared Eu-
clidean distance. The sample codes are the vertices of the
1974-dimension hyper-cube and the templates are points
inside this cube. The similarity measure is simply the dis-
tance between a vertex and that point. The results on the
same data as before with this methodology gives very good
results. We obtain perfect separability with decent-looking
histograms (Fig. 4).
Fig. 4. (a) FNMR and FMR graphs, (b) performance rates
(left) and comparisons histograms (right) for OSIRIS system
with real-valued mean template code and Euclidean distance as
similarity measure.
Yet there could be another similarity measure. If we would
extend the pi to function Pi so that it is a probability func-
tion for ith position in the code such that Pi(x = 1) = pi
and Pi(x = 0) = 1− pi a natural method to verify a new
code could be measuring how probable is it, given the tem-
plate – simply multiply. Of course the probabilities for the
elements in the vector are dependent thus multiplying them
is not theoretically justiﬁed, but the experience in machine
learning lets us expect reasonable results. Additionally we
have to guarantee that there will be no 0 probabilities to
eliminate the eﬀect of zeroing the score (each template el-
ement with 0 value, meaning that for all codes used to
create the template that particular bit was always 0, was
set arbitrary to 0.01). Since there is 1974 bits in the code,
calculation of the pseudo-probability score (Prscore) by mul-
tiplying subsequent values is numerically diﬃcult thus we
applied log operation and summed the logarithms.
Prscore(Tpr,a)=∏
i=1...1974
(Pi(x=ai))= exp
(1974
∑
i=1
loge(Pi(x=ai))
)
,
where Tpr is the template with probabilities functions
Pi for respective positions = 1 . . .1974. Unfortunately the
obtained values of Prscore were of form exp(k) where k
for genuine comparisons was about minus few hundreds
Fig. 5. (a) FNMR and FMR graphs, (b) performance rates
(left) and comparisons histograms (right) for OSIRIS system
with real-valued mean template code and modiﬁed matching al-
gorithm.
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and for impostors minus few thousands. Thus we decided
to divide the k by 1000 to observe the matcher perfor-
mance. Figure 5 plots the FMR, FNMR for this matcher
(Pscore = exp(∑1974i=1 loge(pi)/1000)).
The results are very promising. With this approach we ob-
tain full separation and the histogram shapes (which have
their reﬂection in d′) indicate that such an approach is rea-
sonable and may lead to better results than standard one.
To look into the inﬂuence of the template selection on
the performance of the iris biometric system we observed
also plots representing so-called Dodington-zoo menagerie.
This is very helpful for security analysis. It shows whether
all irises (with respect to coding algorithm) are equally dif-
ferent or are there some types of irises that either are more
similar to others or are less similar to itself. Recent paper
from Yager and Dunstone [18] introduced new division and
naming for diﬀerent behavior of biometric data depending
on mean impostor and genuine scores. We do not want to
go into the details of deciding what is a normal behavior
and what is not. Instead we want to know whether the dif-
ferent template selection algorithm inﬂuences this behavior.
Figure 6 plots the menagerie plots for scores obtained with
Fig. 6. Menagerie plot for two diﬀerent template selection meth-
ods using OSIRIS coding. Each point represents a single iris
showing how well it is on average matched to itself and other
irises.
best iris code (circles) and majority code (crosses) as the
template. It shows that there is no inﬂuence as for the
mean impostors scores, what is a good property, and the
rightmost mean genuine comparisons for majority code are
much smaller what is even better property.
4.2. Czajka’s coding
We performed similar experiments using Czajka’s coding.
Again comparing the genuine cumulative distributions we
noticed that the majority code outperforms others giving
the best results (Fig. 7). However the behavior of others is
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent than in case of OSIRIS coding. Here
we see that the iris code closest to the majority code gives
very poor results (almost as bad as randomly selected iris
Fig. 7. Cumulative distributions of genuine and impostors scores
for diﬀerent templates (best code, random code, majority code
and code closest to majority) for Czajka’s coding algorithm.
code). This lets us suspect that the codes created by this
algorithm are oddly distributed in the code space, since al-
though majority code estimates the codes well the nearest
code does not. Perhaps in this case the majority code does
refer any real iris image, but is rather an virtual object. The
behavior of impostor distributions is even more wired. For
OSIRIS, there were no diﬀerences for diﬀerent templates,
and here the diﬀerences are very signiﬁcant. We see that
the impostor comparisons with majority code are slightly
worse (give lower dissimilarity score) and that choosing
bad template (iris code closest to majority code gives poor
genuine scores) can move the impostors to the right. We
can guess that the ﬁrst observation may be due to not equal
distributions of ones and zeros in this type of coding thus
averaging may lead to code that better ﬁts diﬀerent codes
(e.g., has more ones). The second observation results from
the fact that a bad template in more noisy, hence the impos-
tor scores look more random. Both of these facts may prove
that this type of coding codes not only the individual char-
acteristics but also some kind of more global information.
This is quite interesting conclusion and will be a subject
for further research.
Table 3 summarizes results of the experiments. We see that
we obtained worse results than for OSIRIS but the averag-
ing property of majority code is visible also in this case.
The cumulative distributions from Fig. 7 let us assume
that we may expect undesirable distribution changes in
menagerie plots. Indeed, Fig. 8 shows that changing the
template selection method for majority coding the users
tend to be more wolfy – mean value of impostor scores
gets smaller (diﬀerent users are more similar).
Table 3
Summary of veriﬁcation performance for diﬀerent
template selection method for Czajka’s coding algorithm
Indexes
Best Majority
Closest to
code code
majority
code
EER [%] 0.662 0.542 1.60
FNMR
(FMR=0%) [%]
0.82 0.63 3.09
d′ 6.87 7.69 4.99
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Fig. 8. Menagerie plot for two diﬀerent template selection meth-
ods using Czajka’s coding. Each point represents a single iris
showing how well it is on average matched to itself and other
irises
These experiments prove that a really good understanding
of the codes and their properties is needed to propose an
bio-encryption algorithm for it.
5. Conclusions and further work
Concluding these experiments we claim (in opposite to
other authors, e.g., [15]) that for binary iris coding algo-
rithms using the majority code as the template leads to bet-
ter results. These experiment prove how important is the
template selection problem. It was not addressed before in
work on biometric template protection, but it seems to be
crucial for most of the methods used there. All of them
assume that we have a reference code that can be seen as
a codeword of error-correcting code and all the query codes
lie around it in a distance less than assumed threshold. We
showed that depending on the template selection we can
obtain diﬀerent results and that the good understanding of
the space of the codes is crucial.
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